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Abstract
The use of Electronic Fee Collection (EFC) system is widespread in
Europe, to charge drivers for the use of toll roads. It is based on a wireless
high-frequency communication between an On Board Unit (OBU) in the
cars and a Road Side Equipment (RSE). The data is exchanged using
the Dedicated Short Range Protocol (DSRC), with a working frequency
of 5.8 GHz.
Several projects and research have shown that EFC lacks good security
features. A weak encryption mechanism (Data Encryption Algorithm)
is used to provide authentication features, and the link is not encrypted.
Therefore, the system is susceptible to suffer an attack, which could
bring undesirable consequences for both the road users and the service
providers.
In this thesis, the feasibility of building a device capable of eavesdrop-
ping the communication in EFC has been explored. For this, Universal
Software Radio Peripherals (USRP) and the GNU Radio framework have
been used. These tools are part of the Software Defined Radio (SDR)
scope, and they are publicly available and cheap. To establish a DSRC
link, commercial RSE and OBU devices have been utilized.
Although an error-free signal receiver was not achieved, the developed
program is able to obtain a high amount of information from the system.
It makes possible to visualize the downlink and uplink signals, both in
time and frequency domain. This shows that, without an encryption
mechanism, it can be possible to eavesdrop the communication and
potentially read private data from the users.
Additionally, some other tests have been performed with the described
tools. One of them shows that, the signal emission of other wireless
systems in the 5.8 GHz band, could cause an interference and interrupt
the EFC communication. The risk of suffering a replay attack is also
explored.
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Chapter1Introduction
1.1 Intelligent Transportation Systems and EFC
EFC is one of the applications within the scope of Intelligent Transportation Systems
(ITS). These involve both Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I)
communications, to provide services such as traffic management, traffic information
broadcast, or even collision avoidance. While most of these potential applications
have not been widely implemented yet, EFC has a significant presence in most of
the developed countries in the world.
EFC is based on a wireless communication between two devices, a Road Side
Equipment (RSE) and an On Board Unit (OBU). The OBU shall identify the road
user when reaching a toll point, and the RSE shall be installed in these areas and
read the information contained in the OBUs. Besides, the RSE will be connected
to a centralized system, containing all the necessary information to complete the
payment.
In most EFC systems in Europe, DSRC is the protocol used for the wireless data
exchange between the OBU and the RSE [Com15]. The Norwegian implementation
of EFC is called AutoPASS, and it is based on the European standards for DSRC
and EFC [Adm14].
1.2 Motivation
It is very important to take security issues into consideration in EFC. The data
exchange between the RSE and the OBU contains private information about the
users, and should not be accessed by non-authorized parties. Furthermore, it should
be granted that nobody can build fake devices for illegitimate purposes, such as using
the toll roads and then make another user pay for that.
EFC implements both authentication and access control mechanisms [CEN11].
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More details will be given in the next chapter. The Data Encryption Standard (DES)
cipher is used in both mechanisms. Nowadays, DES is not considered as a secure
encryption method, mainly because of the short key, which is only 56-bit long. With
the computation capabilities available nowadays, this makes DES vulnerable against
brute-force key search attacks [des].
In addition to the weaknesses of DES, there is another point to remark. The
packets in the DSRC communication between the OBU and the RSE are not encrypted,
leaving open the possibility of sniffing the DSRC link and obtaining private user
information. Even more, it could also be possible to perform a replay attack against
the system, using the captured information and building a DSRC transmitter.
All the characteristics described above justify the need of making a further study
of the EFC system. Some previous work has been conducted on this area by other
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) students, and it will be
described in the following chapters.
1.3 Objectives
This thesis will continue the analysis of the toll road system security, focusing on
building a DSRC radio device which is able to receive and decode the signals involved
in an EFC transaction. The no-encryption of the link should allow an attacker to
eavesdrop the DSRC link and read the protocol messages and the user data, by
building a radio receiver. The main objective of the project is to prove whether
it is feasible to build such a device, using publicly available tools and free signal
processing software.
Additionally, the possibility of replaying the received radio signals against one of
the legitimate devices will be explored, and other tests might be performed. The
EFC system itself will be studied.
1.4 Methodology
First of all, a DSRC link containing EFC data will be established. This will be done
using a commercial RSE device, and several OBU devices used in the AutoPASS
system. The RSE needs to be configured by running a controlling software, that
must also implement all the necessary logic in order to complete a transaction with
an OBU. This program will be developed using a driver provided by Kapsch, the
manufacturer of the RSE.
After this, the DSRC receiver will be developed using Software Defined Radio
(SDR) tools, with the goal of eavesdropping that communication. For this, a Universal
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Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) will be used, with antennas designed for DSRC
5.8 GHz applications. In addition, the free-licensed framework GNU Radio will be
used to develop a Digital Signal Processing (DSP) software. This framework is based
on the interconnection of signal processing blocks to build SDR applications. All the
blocks are created by contributors around the world, and some of them are included
in the GNU Radio installation package. However, it’s possible to install new blocks,
and also to write new ones.
Apart from building a receiver, the possibility of recording and replaying the
DSRC signals, and some other additional test, will be performed during this thesis,
with the goal of contributing to the security analysis of the EFC system.
1.5 Content
– Chapter 1 gives an overview on the project, and summarizes the motivation
and goals.
– Chapter 2 explains the most important features of EFC, focusing on the
security of the system.
– Chapter 3 goes through the physical and link layers of DSRC, describing the
most relevant information needed to build the SDR receiver.
– Chapter 4 describes the configuration process of the RSE unit used in this
project, and the communication with an OBU.
– Chapter 5 is based on the whole process of developing the receiver, including
the fundamental signal processing theory behind it, and the obtained results.
– Chapter 6 describes additional tests performed with the SDR tools, regarding
to signal replay and interference.
– Chapter 7 gives some research conclusions, and proposes some guidelines for
further work.

Chapter2Electronic Fee Collection andsecurity issues
In this section, an overview about the EFC system using DSRC will be given.
Particularly, some possible attacks and threats against the system will be presented
and discussed.
2.1 Electronic Fee Collection with DSRC
2.1.1 Background on EFC
In several countries around the world, electronic toll collection systems are used
to charge the users of the toll roads. In many of these countries, manual payment
systems are also implemented. This electronic collection systems are not always
interoperable, since each country developed them independently. Therefore, many
times, a single user needs several different OBUs to use the electronic toll collection
system in different countries.
Back in 2004, the European Commission published the Directive 2004/52/EC,
which some years later would result in the Decision 2009/750/EC. These publications
define an European Electronic Toll System (EETS), which has not been implemented
yet, but gives some valuable guidelines for the countries in the EU to follow for their
fee collection systems. The wireless technologies within the scope of these rules are
Satellite Positioning (GNSS), GSM and DSRC [Com15].
Even if there is not complete interoperability in Europe right now, almost all the
currently implemented systems are compliant with the Decision published by the
European Commission. Most of them use DSRC at 5.8 GHz. In addition, there are
some providers that have developed joint solutions, thus enabling the customers to
access the tolling networks of the countries involved using a single OBU. An example
of this is the EasyGo system between the Scandinavian countries.
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Figure 2.1: Relations between DSRC standards. Source: [CEN07]
2.1.2 EFC-DSRC standards
The European Committee of Standardization (CEN) has approved and published
several standards regarding EFC with DSRC. These standards are the base for many
of the toll collection systems in Europe, AutoPASS system among them.
There are separate standards for each protocol layer of the EFC-DSRC stack, and
they are related as shown in the Picture 2.1. The documents include the specifications
of the DSRC physical layer (EN 12253), link layer (EN 12795) and application layer
(EN 12834).
EN 13372 defines sets of values for DSRC parameters in the three layers, called
DSRC profiles. EN 14906 provides specifications for EFC attributes, application
functions and a EFC transaction model. Finally, EN 15509 specifies the implementa-
tion of EFC using the previously mentioned standards, aiming to be a reference for
interoperable EFC systems based in DSRC.
2.1.3 The EFC-DSRC protocol stack
As mentioned in the previous section, the DSRC protocol in Europe is standardized by
CEN, and three layers can be distinguished, the physical, link-layer and application
layer. In top of the application layer, the actual EFC applications (like AutoPASS)
will run.
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Figure 2.2: DSRC protocol stack. Source: [CEN07]
The DSRC application layer (or L7) defines some services, which shall be used by
the application running on top of it. In this case, the EFC application builds some
functions using the underlying L7 services. The most important services are:
– GET: to obtain data.
– SET: to modify data.
– ACTION: an action is performed. In EFC, this service is used by the GET-
STAMPED function, which will be explained later.
– INITIALIZATION: this service is used when the RSE and the OBU start the
communication.
– EVENT-REPORT: in EFC, this service is used to close the transaction.
On the other hand, all the data contained in the OBU units (vehicle plate number,
information about the contract, ...) is specified as EFC attributes in the EN 15509
document. This data is accessed or modified by the RSE using the services mentioned
above.
2.1.4 DSRC physical layer
In order to eavesdrop an EFC transaction, it’s necessary to study in depth the
physical layer of the DSRC stack. Therefore, the EN 12253 standard [CEN04a] has
a very high relevance on this thesis.
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This document describes all the aspects related to both the downlink and uplink
signals in DSRC at 5.8 GHz. All this information is necessary to develop a proper
receiver later on. A greater description of this physical layer is given in the next
chapter.
2.1.5 Data exchange between the RSE and the OBU
The communication between the two entities which exchange EFC data, namely the
EFC and the OBU, consists on an exchange of data frames using the 5.8 GHz link.
The EFC, when active, sends periodically Beacon Service Table (BST) messages. This
beacons contain information about the available applications in top of DSRC (in our
case EFC, but it could be a different one, or even more than one). Communication
parameters such as information about the sub-carrier frequency (more details on this
are given in the next chapter) are also included. The BSTs also have a Beacon ID,
in order to identify which RSE unit sent the beacon message.
In order to start an EFC transaction, an initialization process is performed. When
the OBU receives one of the BSTs, it makes a check with the last received BST. If
the Beacon ID of the newly received BST is different from the previous one, or the
time between the reception of those two BSTs is higher than 255 seconds, the OBU
goes ahead with the process. If neither of those conditions is fulfilled, the BST is
discarded.
If the BST is accepted, the next step is checking whether there is a match between
the applications included in the BST and the ones that supports the OBU. If so, a
Vehicle Service Table (VST) is built and sent back to the RSE. This message includes
information about the contract between the user and the toll road service provider,
such as the contract provider and type of contract. The frame containing the VST is
identified by a LID (Link Identifier) number, randomly selected by the OBU.
Upon reception of the VST, the LID contained in it is stored by the RSE, and
associated to the correspondent OBU. After this point, the RSE can send GET and
SET messages in order to complete the EFC transaction. After finishing it, the
transaction is closed and the LID associated with the OBU deleted from the RSE.
2.2 Security features in EFC
In a system like EFC, where payment transactions are included, some security
requirements should be granted. The DSRC-EFC standards define two security
features: authentication and access control. The first one implies that the OBU
should be recognized as valid in order to access the tolling services, and the second
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one requires the road-side unit to authenticate before accessing or modifying the
parameters in the OBU.
The authentication of the OBU is performed using a Message Authentication
Code (MAC), whereas the RSE performs a calculation of a parameter called Access
Credentials to gain access to the OBU. These two mechanisms are described in more
detail below.
2.2.1 Security levels
The EN 15509 standard defines two different security-levels for EFC. The security
level 0 requires only authentication of the OBU, while the security level 1 (the one
implemented by AutoPASS) requires additionally access control to the data in the
OBU. Therefore, the RSE also has to proof its legitimacy. When working with only
the security level 0, a fake RSE could communicate with OBU devices and access its
data.
2.2.2 Access Control
OBUs store an 8-octet Access Key (AcK), derived from a 16-octet Master AcK.
Details about the key derivation in EFC can be found in EN 15509, Annex B. When
receiving a valid BST, the OBU sends in the VST message both an Access Credential
reference (AC-CR-KeyReference), which includes a reference to the key generation,
and a 4-octet random number. The RSE then computes the Access Credentials value
(AC-CR), using the random number sent by the OBU as input and the AcK as key.
The DES algorithm is used to compute AC-CR. Afterwards, the AC-CR is sent to
the OBU, which verifies if the value is correct. If yes, the RSE is authenticated. (See
Figure 2.3).
Note that this procedure is only performed when the system implements Security
Level 1. With Security Level 0, the RSE doesn’t have to calculate any credentials,
and therefore doesn’t need to authenticate before using a GET or SET service.
2.2.3 Authentication
As stated above, the authentication of the OBU is based on the calculation of a MAC.
When the RSE request attributes from the OBU, a GET-STAMPED message (which
uses the ACTION DSRC-L7 service) is sent. This message contains the identifier for
the requested attributes (AttributeIDList), and a random number (RandomRSE).
The random number and the values of the requested attributes (AttributeList) are
concatenated and used as the input for the MAC calculation, by means of the
Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) method. An
Authentication Key (AuK) and DES encryption are used. The AuK (8 octets) is
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Figure 2.3: Access control in EFC. Source: [CEN07]
Figure 2.4: Authentication of the OBU in EFC.
derived from a Master AuK (16 octets), using values known both for the RSE and
the OBU (Payment Means and Contract Provider attributes). The OBU stores 8
different AuK from 8 different key generations, so the RSE specifies which AuK to use
in the GET-STAMPED message (KeyRef value). When the OBU answers the RSE,
the MAC is included in the message, and then verified by the RSE to authenticate
the OBU.
2.3 Security threats
EFC implements an authentication mechanism for both the RSE and the OBU.
However, this doesn’t imply that the EFC systems are secure. Indeed, there are
many arguments that support the lack of security in EFC.
First, both the authentication and access control mechanisms are based in the
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DES standard. Therefore, both for the calculation of the MAC codes by the OBU
and the calculation of the access credentials value by the RSE, 56-bit long temporal
keys are used. This key length is very short to be considered secure nowadays, as it
would be feasible to recover them by performing a brute-force attack.
Another important point to consider is that the DSRC link is not encrypted.
Therefore, it could be possible to eavesdrop the communication by using a customized
DSRC receiver and get private information. In addition, it also makes easier to
perform a replay attack against the system, capturing the data transmitted from one
OBU to the RSE, and later re-transmit that information to the RSE.
2.3.1 EFC security assessment
Back in 2015, CEN published a technical report [CEN15] analyzing the security
threats for EFC. Many topics were discussed in this document, and some concrete
attacks and possible solutions were presented.
The report focused mainly in the weakness of the authentications and access
control mechanisms, due to the short keys. Some of the most relevant attack scenarios
are discussed below.
Brute force attack against the DES keys
Both the Access Control and Authentication keys are subject to brute force attack.
When an OBU receives a BST, it includes in the VST message two values (Access
Credentials reference and Random Number) used to compute the AC-CR value by
the RSE. If a customized OBU unit is built, a chosen-plaintext attack could be
performed, obtaining AC-CR values from an RSE, which could be used to retrieve
the Access Credentials key.
In a similar way, if a customized RSE is built, a chosen-plaintext attack could
be performed against an OBU, and obtaining MAC values retrieve the AuK. In
this case, the GET-STAMPED message (which includes part of the input for the
calculation of the MAC value by the OBU) must also include the Access Credentials
value calculated by the RSE, so that the OBU verifies the authenticity of the RSE.
Therefore, it is necessary that either the RSE knows the value of the AuK of the
OBU (which could be obtained from the previously mentioned attack), or that the
Security Level 0 is used, as this scenario doesn’t require the calculation of the access
control credentials.
An attacker with in possession of these keys could clone and build fake OBU
units, copying or faking the attribute set of valid OBUs.
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Integrity attack against the VST data
The VST message is not protected by a MAC code, so an attacker could modify the
parameters sent in this message. Some of these parameters are used as the input for
the calculation of the Access Credentials by the RSE, so if an attacker manages to
change these values, the access control mechanism would fail.
Replay attack against the RSE
Although this attack is not specifically mentioned in [CEN15], a DSRC-capable
transceiver could intercept the messages involved in the communication between a
RSE and a certain OBU, and later replay the uplink messages against the RSE. This
could involve a security breach in the system.
Eavesdropping the communication
As mentioned before, the DSRC link is not encrypted at any point. This means that,
building a DSRC receiver, an attacker could read the data exchanged in the EFC
transactions. Apart from reading user-related data, some other parameters (as the
ones used as input to generate the Access Control and MAC codes) could be read.
This could also be an advantage for an attacker aiming to retrieve the system keys.
Obtaining Master keys
After obtaining authentication and access control keys, an attacker could try to
obtain the master keys from which the previously stolen keys have been derived.
However, this is considered as unfeasible nowadays, as the key derivation algorithm
(3DES) is considered to be secure.
2.4 Related work
In the previous years, some other NTNU master students studied the security
features and weaknesses in the EFC system. In 2016, Jonathan Hansen studied in
his Master’s Thesis [Han16] the possibility of building an DSRC transceiver, and
also presented some concrete brute-force attacks which could be performed to break
the authentication and access control mechanisms.
Another Master’s Degree student, Sverre Turter Sandvold, focused one year
later [San17] on obtaining MAC codes from OBUs, which could be later used to
retrieve the authentication key used by the OBU to generate those MACs. Using
a professional DSRC transceiver, and customizing the GET-STAMPED message,
he managed to obtain MAC codes from OBUs with known keys (to bypass the
access control mechanism). He also presented a method based on rainbow tables to
brute-force the authentication key.
Chapter3The DSRC Physical and Link Layer
As stated before, the physical layer of the DSRC stack is the most relevant one for
the work performed during this thesis, as the knowledge of the physical parameters of
the signal (modulation, bit rate and so on) is necessary in order to build a transceiver.
Therefore, an in-depth study of this layer has been performed, using the [CEN04a]
standard as a guideline. In this chapter, the most relevant aspects of the link layer
and the frame structure will be also presented.
3.1 DSRC at 5.8 GHz
In Europe, the use of DSRC in the 5.8 GHz ISM band was standardized by CEN. As
this is a non-licensed band, other applications (not necessarily involving a radiocom-
munication) could emit power in the same band, and therefore cause interference.
But since all the applications that make use of this band (including EFC) involve
short-range signals, this is more difficult to happen.
The CEN standard defines 4 possible channels within the 5.8 GHz band, where
the downlink carrier is allocated: 5.7975 GHz, 5.8025 GHz, 5.8075 GHz and 5.8125
GHz. AutoPASS uses the 5.7975 channel. A signal with enough power emitted in
this frequency should wake up the OBUs within the coverage range (the OBU devices
are not connected to any power source).
In the following sections, both the downlink and the uplink will be described in
more detail. As one of the goals in this thesis is to build a device capable to read the
information involved in the communication between the RSE and the OBU, both
links must be studied.
3.2 Downlink
The RSE units in AutoPASS transmit information using a carrier at 5.7975 GHz, as
indicated above. The signal is polarized hand-left (this is relevant in order to choose
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Figure 3.1: The uplink and downlink channels in DSRC, with downlink carrier at
5.7975 GHz.
an optimal antenna).
Baseband signal and modulation
The modulating signal, i. e. the pulse based baseband signal carrying the binary
information, has a 500 kbit/s bit rate. The used data coding is FM0. In this scheme,
the "1" bits are coded with a transition in the beginning and in the end of the bit
interval, while the "0" bits have an additional transition in the middle of the bit
interval. The modulation used in the downlink is a two level amplitude modulation.
In this type of modulation, the sinusoidal carrier signal changes its amplitude between
a high and a low signal level, according to the shape of the baseband signal.
It was a complex task to find information about the baseband bandwidth of
the signal, even in the standards. However, after performing some signal spectrum
recordings (described in the Chapter 4, it’s estimated that the downlink baseband
bandwidth is 500 KHz for the downlink, and 250 KHz for the uplink.
When the information is transmitted via the modulated radiofrequency signal,
the amount of spectrum occupied is the double of the baseband signal bandwidth.
So, the radiofrequency signal carrying the information requires 1 MHz bandwidth for
the downlink, and 500 KHz for the downlink, which can be slightly higher in the real
transmission.
Preamble
Another important parameter to take into consideration is the preamble of the frame.
As the transmission is not continuous, but burst-based (there are intervals where
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Table 3.1: Comparison between downlink and uplink physical layer in DSRC
Parameter Downlink Uplink
Carrier modulation 2-level Amplitude Modula-tion BPSK
Carrier central freq. 5.7975 GHz 1.5 MHz or 2 MHz separa-tion from downlink carrier
Data coding FM0 NRZI
Bit rate 500 Kbit/s 250 Kbit/s
Preamble 16 high-low level pulse al-ternating sequence (32 µs)
32 to 36 µs modulated with
subcarrier, and 8 NRZI-
coded bits
Figure 3.2: The FM0 baseband signal
no information is sent), the receiver needs to know somehow when the data frames
start. In the downlink signal, the preamble consists on an alternating sequence of
high and low level pulses (2 µs of duration each), and has a length of 16 bits (with a
tolerance of 1 bit).
3.3 Uplink
The OBUs make use of a subcarrier (another signal with a certain separation in
relation to the main carrier frequency) to send the uplink data to the RSE. In this
case, the standard specifies two possibilities: a subcarrier at 1.5 MHz or at 2 MHz
from the carrier frequency. The standard [CEN04b] recommends the use of the 1.5
MHz subcarrier whenever possible, for interoperability with legacy installations. The
OBU units, however, must support both subcarriers, and it’s the RSE in the BST
messages which specifies the subcarrier frequency to use.
The modulation used in the DSRC uplink is Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK).
With Phase Shift Keying (PSK) modulation, the carrier is modulating by changing
its phase depending on the symbol value. BPSK is the simplest PSK modulation,
as the carrier signal phase changes between only two values: 0 and 180 degrees.
Therefore, BPSK also carries one bit per symbol.
There are also other significant changes in the baseband signal: the employed
data coding is Non Return to Zero Inverted (NRZI), instead of FM0. The reason of
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Figure 3.3: The modulated downlink signal. The bit sequence here is: 01101.
Source: [ETS04]
Figure 3.4: Structure of the DSRC link layer frame. Source: [CEN03a]
employing the data coding, both in the uplink and in the downlink, is to make the
bit information independent on the value on the symbol itself, but on the symbol
transition. This way, if due to the transmission the symbol values are inverted (low
level transmitted symbols are received as high level, and vice versa), the information
will still be correct.
The binary rate is also lower, 250 Kbit/s. The uplink signal also includes a
preamble.
3.4 DSRC link layer
When either the OBU or the RSE transmit data on the wireless link, they send
a frame with a specified structure (shown in Figure 3.3). This frame contains a
Link Identifier (LID), which can be either private (to address the communication
between the RSE and a particular OBU device) or a broadcast LID. It can contain
(or not) data corresponding to the application layer, which is included in the Link
layer Protocol Data Unit (LPDU) field. A Frame Check Sequence field is added after
the LPDU. Also, a flag is included at the beginning and at the end of the frame.
This frame is sent after the physical level preamble, described in the previous section.
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Figure 3.5: BST-VST exchange with private window allocation.
The MAC sublayer1 within the DSRC link layer is responsible for the access
control to the wireless interface, in order collisions not to happen. The resources
are allocated following the time division multiple access (TDMA) technique, which
means that different time slots or windows are allocated for different frames, both in
the downlink and the uplink. The RSE has the function to allocate uplink windows
to the OBU units that want to send a frame. These windows can be either public or
private. When the downlink frame includes a private LID, previously assigned for
the communication between the RSE and a certain OBU, a private uplink window is
allocated for the uplink frame answering the downlink frame. On the other hand,
when a frame with a broadcast LID is sendt by the RSE, several public uplink
windows are allocated one after each other. These may be used by any OBU device
in the coverage area.
During the transmission of BSTs by the RSE, the broadcast LID is used, as the
beacons are intended to be received by any valid OBU within the coverage area.
When an OBU receives one of the beacons, it has to answer with a VST message.
However, at this point no private LID has been assigned yet. This means the OBU
device can only use an uplink public window to communicate with the RSE. These
windows are smaller than the private ones, and are not large enough to support the
VST sending. Therefore, the OBU has to request a private window allocation before
sending the VST. Upon reception of the BST, the OBU application layer generates a
private LID, which is sent in the private window allocation request. This request
is processed by the RSE, and afterwards a private window allocation frame is sent
back to the OBU, that now has a private window available to transmit the VST and
the subsequent frames involved in the transaction.
1Here, MAC makes reference to the protocol layer with that name, not to Message Authentication
Code

Chapter4Setting up the DSRCcommunication
In this chapter, the steps followed to perform a successful DSRC communication
between the OBU and the RSE will be described. The data exchange involved in
this communication will be later used as input for the DSRC receiver, built with an
USRP and GNU Radio.
4.1 The OBU Programming Station
To fulfill an EFC transaction with an OBU, it is necessary to have an active RSE
device, which sends beacon messages periodically and handles the responses from the
OBU. For this purpose, the OPS-1955 (OBU Programming Station, manufactured
by Kapsch) will be used.
This device is used by toll road service providers (or similar entities) to program
the OBU, before delivering it to the user of the road. This step, also known as OBU
personalization, includes the configuration of all the customer specific data in the
OBU, so that the user can access the services provided by the toll road, generally
both access to the road and payment. As the OPS-1955 implements the EFC and
DSRC protocol stack, it can be used in a lab environment as a RSE, in order to
recreate the communication that takes place between a RSE and an OBU in a real
toll road.
To carry out the communication between the RSE and the OBU, it is necessary
to develop and run a software that configures the RSE with all the parameters
needed to initialize the radio link. This software is also responsible for handling
the bidirectional RSE-OBU communication, and will be run in another computer
connected to the OPS-1955 (host computer). The connection will be done with an
USB cable, that will also be used to power the OPS-1955, which is an USB-powered
device.
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4.2 Development of the RSE controlling software
Kapsch provides an API called Layer7, which acts as a interface between the OBS-
1955, and the software that controls this device (host application). When the RSE
receives a frame from the OBU in the DSRC link, it will be notified to the host
application via the Layer7 Protocol, which implements some predefined messages
for the communication between the OPS-1955 and the host application. The Layer7
library implements also a set of functions, which make it easier to develop the host
application. The driver will encapsulate the messages sent between the OPS-1955
and the host application, and will handle the communication between then. The
application is only responsible for handling the data contained in the Layer7 messages.
First, the software package containing the Layer7 driver is installed, following
the steps indicated in [AG14a]. After completing the installation, the driver will
run as a service and the host computer can communicate with the OPS-1955. Upon
successful communication, the LED in the OPS-1955 will turn on with blue colour.
Now that the driver is installed and the host computer and the RSE can com-
municate, it’s possible to develop and run a host application, using the provided
Layer7 API functions. This software is written in C, as that’s the language the
driver supports for function calls from an application. Kapsch provides, together
with the driver installation and the libraries, a small demo RSE controlling software.
This software implements many of the functions that are necessary to configure the
RSE and handle the messages from the OBU, and also many structures related to
the data attributes defined in the standards. Thus, this code is very useful for the
development of the controlling software.
In order to configure the RSE, the main task is to write a main function that
uses the code mentioned above, as well as modifying some of the functions that are
called. The developed host application implements the BST sending functionality,
after configuring the DSRC link. In order to build a full EFC transaction, more
functionality has to be implemented in the controlling software. In this project, the
RSE will just send beacon frames, but will not answer to the received VST in order
to request more OBU attributes. However, the BST-VST exchange is sufficient to
attempt the link eavesdropping and test the receiver, which will be described in the
following chapter.
Before starting coding the application, the programmer’s manual provided by
Kapsch [AG14b] has been read, with the aim of gaining better understanding of
the Layer7 API. This manual provides a description of the Layer7 communication
and all the possible messages and parameters, and gives a guideline about how the
OPS-1955 should be initialized. This information has been also very helpful for the
coding process.
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Figure 4.1: OPS-1955 configuration and communication with an OBU.
The executable file used to control the OPS-1955 is added as an attachment. Note
that this file requires to be run in the same directory as the Layer7 Driver header
file, and this is proprietary software from Kapsch.
4.3 Communication between the OPS-1955 and an OBU
After running the application software, the RSE starts sending beacon frames peri-
odically, with a frequency configured by the previously mentioned software. When
an OBU is placed within the coverage range of the RSE, a VST is sent in the uplink,
and it’s received by the RSE, that notifies this event to the controlling software, via
a Notify Application Beacon message. This process is described in the Figure 4.1.
This Notify Application Message, send from the RSE to the host running the
controlling software, includes the parameters sent with the VST. This way, the
software can process that information and perform the subsequent phases of the
transaction.
A printing function was defined in the software, so that a message would pop un
in the console upon BST reception. In addition, one of the OBUs available has two
leds: one yellow and one red. When the yellow one is light on, indicates that the
OBU has waken up to a signal in the desired frequency range. When the red light is
also on, the OBU has also identified a correct BST. Here, both led lights go on for a
short amount of time, when the OBU detects a BST.
Visualizing the signal spectrum
After doing the setup on the RSE and communicating it with an OBU, several
recordings with the tool GQRX were performed. This tool is built on GNU Radio,
and provides a GUI where it’s possible to record the signal and see its frequency
spectrum and how it changes with the time. This was very useful in order to gain
better understanding of the characteristics of both the uplink and downlink signals.
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Figure 4.2: Frequency spectrum centered at 5.798 GHz.
Figure 4.3: Frequency spectrum centered at 5.7992 GHz.
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In the Figure 4.2, where the receiver is tuned close to the downlink carrier
signal, the BST broadcast can be seen in the frequency spectrum. The higher
power component, centered at downlink carrier frequency (5.7975 GHz), can be
seen, together with the peaks corresponding to the BSTs and expanded along all the
bandwidth of the downlink. Although it can’t be seen in the picture, because the
receiver is tuned at 5.798 GHz, the signal also has power in the frequency spectrum
below the carrier frequency.
In the Figure 4.3, the uplink VST messages can be seen, centered at 5.799 GHz.
As the RSE only sends BSTs and the controlling application doesn’t perform any
further function upon reception of the VST, the OBU continues sending VSTs during
certain time. This is, most likely, because the OBU interprets that the VST is lost
in the wireless link, as no response is received.

Chapter5Developing a DSRC burst receiver
This chapter will focus in the work performed to eavesdrop the DSRC link. The
tools used will be described, as well as the approach followed. Finally, the obtained
results will be presented and discussed.
To perform this, first a literature review has been carried out. This has included
a study of the DSRC standards (specially the one related to the physical layer), a
review of previous works in the area of signal decoding with USRPs and GNU Radio,
and also a study on several digital signal processing concepts. The tutorials provided
by GNU Radio, specially , have been very useful.
5.1 Universal Software Radio Peripherals (USRP)
For this project, a USRP (model B200 Mini) has been used. This radio devices
(manufactured by Ettus Research) permit tuning the radio signal by choosing the
center frequency, and deliver the I/Q baseband data after performing the necessary
processing stages. This device can be connected to a computer by USB, for further
processing of the data using a software. The frequency range of the device goes from
70 MHz to 6 GHz, which makes it suitable for DSRC applications at 5.8 GHz [Resa].
The basic architecture of the USRP is shown in Figure 5.1. The RF signal is
received using an antenna connected to one of the ports. As there are two ports,
full-duplex operation is possible using two antennas. At reception, the high-frequency
radio signal is then mixed with a local oscillator, downconverting the signal to a
so-called Intermediate Frequency. Later the analog signal is converted to a digital
one, in order to process it in software.
A circular-polarized 5,8 GHz antenna by SpiroNET is used for signal reception.
This antenna was also used by Sandvold in his Master’s Thesis [San17], as it fulfills
the physical layer specification for DSRC.
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Figure 5.1: The USRP block architecture. Source: [Resa]
Figure 5.2: Setup of the experiment. The USRP is placed next to the RSE and
the OBU, in order to receive a good signal power level.
The LO will be tuned as closely as possible to the RF frequency, but there will be
a small offset between the LO frequency and the RF frequency. Therefore, a second
stage of tuning is performed with the already digital signal. The FPGA block of
the USRP accounts for this task [Resa]. After this, a baseband complex signal is
delivered via USB connection for further processing. In this project, GNU Radio
is used, a digital signal processing tool that will be described in detail in the next
section.
The USRP open-software driver is called UHD, and it enables to deploy appli-
cations that can address the USRP and use the signal data for further processing.
USRP devices are widely used with GNU Radio.
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5.2 Signal Processing with GNU Radio
From getting the complex baseband signal, to actually obtain the data contained there,
there are still some stages that must be performed. For this, the SDR framework
called GNU Radio will be used. This is a free-software tool that permits using
predefined blocks (previously created by the user community), and also customized
ones, to build a software that performs the desired processing.
GNU Radio also includes a GUI called GNU Radio Companion (GRC). This tool
makes a lot easier to develop SDR applications, adding the existing or own blocks to
the flowgraph.
GNU Radio blocks can be developed both in Python and C++. When the
performance of the block is relevant, C++ is recommended [Rad]. Therefore, most of
the signal processing predefined blocks in GNU Radio are written in C++. The most
relevant ones include also some documentation, so the integration in the application
of interest becomes easier.
One of the advantages of working with GNU Radio to develop signal processing
software, is that there is a big community contributing with new developments and
creating new blocks for different functions. This is very valuable when working in a
project like this one. It is very easy to download and install blocks created by a third
party, and also modifying the code of these blocks if necessary. Once installed, they
can be added to the GRC flowgraph. Most of the blocks take some parameters as
an input, in order to perform their function. For example, a filter will take a cutoff
frequency/frequencies value as a parameter, among others. These must be indicated
before running the program.
Installing new blocks
Throughout the development of the receiver, some third party blocks have been
installed and added to the flowgraph. This is a very easy process in GNU Radio.
When a new block is created, a so-called out-of-tree module is generated. This
consists mainly on a folder structure with many different files, including the code
corresponding to the block logic itself, either in Python or C++. Many blocks can
be contained in a single module.
In order to add these third party block or blocks, contained in a module, it’s
necessary to install the module. The guidelines and commands for this are given
in the GNU Radio tutorials [Rad]. Another option is to generate a new out-of-tree
module and write brand new blocks. Some guidance about how to write these
blocks is also given in the tutorials, along with some flowgraph examples. All this
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Figure 5.3: A simple flowgraph in GRC. In the right side, a list with the installed
blocks. Below the flowgraph, a console providing some output, and a window
indicating the parameters of the selected block.
has resulted very useful to gain better understanding about GNU Radio and the
possibilities it offers.
5.3 Related Work
As mentioned in the Chapter 2, some previous Master’s Thesis at NTNU researched
EFC and DSRC, and some part of that work had the focus on building a DSRC
transceiver.
Einar Thorsrud worked in his thesis on the implementation of a DSRC link
[Tho09], using GNU Radio and creating several signal-processing modules, aiming to
build a transceiver and successfully establish a DSRC data exchange, similar to the
one performed in the EFC system.
This work was continued later in 2016 by Jonathan Hansen, who aimed to recreate
the communication between a RSE and an OBU, using an USRP device and GNU
Radio working as the RSE unit, and commercial OBU devices [Han16]. Hansen took
many of the blocks used by Thorsrud and edited some of them, with the goal of
building a working transceiver software.
One year later, Sandvold reused Hansen’s software in his thesis, making also
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additional modifications. As stated in the second chapter, his goal was obtaining
MAC codes from OBU devices, and he aimed to achieve this using the DSRC
transceiver as a RSE unit, in the same way as Hansen did [San17].
Unfortunately, after these projects the DSRC transceiver was not working properly.
One of the problems these students were facing, was that they could not obtain a
correct EFC signal from an OBU to test the receiver. As their transmitter was not
working properly, no answer from the commercial OBU devices was obtained, and
the receiver could not be tested with anything but noise. In this thesis, a real DSRC
communication is achieved between commercial RSE and OBU devices, so the DSRC
receiver can be developed and tested without developing a transmitter. ’
Burst reception
Additionally, many people have built and designed GNU Radio software focusing
specifically in reception and transmission of bursty signals. These type of signals,
opposite to continuous signals, have time intervals with data transmission (which
could correspond to a frame or a packet exchanged by the entities involved in the
communication) and intervals where no data is transmitted. During these intervals,
the receiver only gets noise and no valuable information is received.
In order to build a DSRC receiver, it’s very relevant to take this into account.
The receiver should be able to trigger the time slots with data transmission, and
decode the information correctly, following some steps that will be described in the
next section. As many of the blocks in GNU Radio are designed for continuous
transmissions, many projects have focused on developing burst receivers, reusing
some of the predefined modules, modifying them and also creating new ones.
5.4 Building the radio receiver
In this section, the process involving the development of the DSRC receiver will be
described. The different steps involved in the signal reception will be described, and
the implementation for a receiver in GNU Radio will be presented.
5.4.1 Signal processing in reception
The uplink signal in DSRC is modulated using PSK, a modulation based in shifting
the phase of the carrier signal in order to code the different symbols. In DSRC, BPSK
is used, where the signal phase shifts between 0 and 180 degrees. This is the most
robust PSK modulation, but at the same time in only allows the encoding of one bit
per symbol, which makes the bit rate lower than in higher order PSK modulations.
However, as the carrier frequency is high, the bit rate achieved is sufficient for the
DSRC applications.
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To get the bit information from the carrier signal, several steps are involved.
As defined previously, the USRP delivers the baseband samples to the GNU Radio
software. This baseband signal has to be further processed. Following, the actions
that need to be performed, and which will be implemented in GNU Radio, will
be described. They are valid both for the uplink, modulated with BPSK, and the
downlink, modulated with a 2-level Amplitude Modulation.
Filtering
The first step to perform is filtering of the baseband signal, in order to remove all
the frequency components outside the signal bandwidth. This can be achieved by
means of a low-pass filter. In this way, much of the white noise associated with the
transmission will be removed, as well as another signals whose center frequency is
close to the desired one.
Synchronization
This step is very relevant in order to achieve a successful signal reception. As the
transmitter and the receiver are different devices, they are not synchronized, and some
offsets between the transmitted and the received signal may happen. These must be
removed before decoding the signal and obtaining the bitrate. This is achieved using
loop blocks that, based on the previous samples of the received signal, can minimize
the offset. The synchronization task can be split in two: timing recovery and carrier
recovery.
Timing recovery
It’s well known that the transmitter and the receiver use different clock signals. This
causes that, at reception, the signal symbols are not sampled at the optimal point,
therefore increasing the chance of making a wrong decision in the decoder. The goal
of the time recovery process is to align the clock in the receiver with the clock in the
transmitter, so that the symbols are sampled at its maximum signal point.
Carrier recovery
There are several elements that cause an offset between the transmitted and received
signal, in terms of both frequency and phase. These offsets can cause the receiver
not to perform a correct demodulation. Among them, we can find the differences
between the local oscillators in transmission and reception (same nominal frequency,
but some small differences in reality), and also some Doppler-shift effects due to the
movement of the OBU [MR]. A carrier recovery phase is necessary to correct this.
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Symbol decision
After performing filtering and synchronization, the remaining task is getting the
bit information from the baseband signal. In our order 2 modulations (just one bit
encoded per symbol), this is simply determining whether they symbol corresponds to
a high level (bit 1) or a low level (bit 0). After this, the bit stream can be obtained.
However, as in transmission FM0 (downlink) or NRZI (uplink) coding is used, an
additional decoding function is necessary to obtain the original data, which can be
saved to a binary file.
5.4.2 Implementation in GNU Radio
The implementation of a DSRC receiver in GNU Radio will be described here. Note
that there are many different possibilities when it comes to which blocks use, as new
blocks are created or modified constantly. In fact, during this project several different
configurations have been tested. More details will be given in the next section.
Two flowgraphs have been created, one for the uplink and another one for the
downlink. However, the only one outputting bit information is the one corresponding
to the uplink. The downlink decoding is slightly more complex, especially due to the
use of FM0, so a complete receiver development was not achieved. It was chosen to
spend more time working on completing a correct uplink decoding, and solving the
problems related to the bursty signal reception. However, the downlink flowgraph is
useful to visualize the baseband signal, and the guidelines for building the blocks
needed for decoding are given later.
Below, the blocks used for the uplink receiver will be described, together with the
values of the most relevant parameters. The differences with the downlink receiver
flowgraph will be described afterwards.
USRP Source
This first block is necessary to use the USRP as the signal source for the signal
processing software. Here, some important parameters such as the clock rate of the
device and the sampling rate must be configured. The selected clock rate is 30.72
MHz, and the sample rate 3.84 MS/s. Ettus recommends choosing a integer even
ratio between the clock rate and the sample rate [Resb]. This is because decimation
is performed to get the desired sample rate from the master clock rate.
It’s also necessary to configure the frequency of the local oscillator, that will
be the central frequency of the carrier signal (5.799 GHz for the uplink). Another
important value is the gain. After testing several different values, a 40 dB gain is set.
As the USRP B200 mini has 2 antenna ports, the one in use has to be specified as
well.
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Figure 5.4: The GNU Radio flowgraph for the uplink receiver.
Note that, when connecting the USRP to the computer running GNU Radio,
the UHD driver detects automatically the device. Using the "uhd_find_devices"
command, the detected USRPs can be listed, and a correct connection can be verified.
Low Pass Filter
This block implements the filtering functionality defined in the previous section.
Here, the cutoff frequency is set to 250 KHz, and the sample rate must be set with
the same value as in the previous block. A parameter called Transition Width must
also be configured. As the filter is not ideal, it will allow to pass some signal power
above the cutoff frequency. This value represents the distance between the edge of
the passband (where all the signal power passes) and the edge of the stopband (where
no signal power passes). It has been set to 25 KHz. A shorter transition width would
require more filter taps, therefore more calculations and computation resources.
Polyphase Clock Sync
The Polyphase Clock Sync block accounts for the timing recovery. It can also
perform downsampling. In this flowgraph, one sample per symbol is output for
further processing. Therefore, both the values of the input and output samples per
symbol must be introduced. As the input sample rate is 3.84 MS/s, and the symbol
rate is 250 symbols/sec, this ratio is 15.36. For the output, as mentioned before, one
sample per symbol is configured.
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Some other values, such as the loop bandwidth and the filter taps must be set.
Here, the values included in the example flowgraph from the GNU Radio PSK tutorial
have been taken.
Costas Loop
This block is used to correct the phase and frequency offset, and perform carrier
recovery. It’s a software implementation of the phase locked loop (PLL) circuit
designed by the engineer John Costas back in 1956 [Cos56]. Here, a loop bandwidth
has to be introduced again (like in the Polyphase Clock Sync, this is set to 2pi/100
as indicated in the GNU Radio tutorial), and also the loop order (2 for BPSK).
Add Const
Now, the signal should be ready to be decoded. Here, it’s necessary to deal with
the bursty nature of the signal. The time slots where no information is sent must
be somehow skipped. The approach followed here has been adding a constant value
to the signal, so that the white noise present in the no-information time slots never
falls below 0, but the symbol transitions during information transmission do. This
has to do with the next block, whose functionality will be described right below.
After performing some trial and error, recording the signal several times and
obtaining the associated bit rate, a value of 800*10-6 has been configured. This value
has been taken when putting the antenna as close to the OBU device as possible.
Note that it might have to be readjusted depending on the antenna distance and
other circumstances.
Binary Slicer
As BPSK is the most simple PSK modulation, the bit information contained in the
symbols can be extracted just telling whether the sample taken at the highest energy
point of the symbol is above or below 0. This is achieved with the Binary Slicer.
This block outputs a 1 when the sample value is positive, and a 0 when the sample
value is negative. Note that each sample has a size of one octet, so for each bit value
one octet is used, where the only relevant bit is the least significant one.
In the slots with no information, the block will always output a 1. However, when
decoding the signal from the NRZI format to the original information format, these
time slots will be represented with many zeros, because the symbol value doesn’t
change (more information about the NRZI encoding is given in the Chapter 3).
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NRZI decoder
Before saving the bit stream to a file, a decoder block is needed to undo the NRZI
coding and get the actual data. Here, the block created by Thorsrud and rewritten by
Hansen has been used. Some modifications had to be added to solve some compilation
errors found when installing the block. The Python code for this block is included in
the attachments, inside a zip file with the full GNU Radio module.
File Sink
Finally, this block is included to record the bit stream to a file. As mentioned before,
each information bit is contained in one octet. In this block, the path of the file
must be indicated. Also, the override option is active, which means that the previous
information will be deleted upon new recording, unless the information is saved to
another file (changing the path).
GUI Time Sink
Although this block was not necessary for the signal decoding itself, it allows to
visualize the signal on the time domain, which has been very useful during the
development process, and also allowed to gain a much better understanding of the
signal. Here, the sample rate of the signal is requested in order to adjust the time
scale.
5.4.3 The downlink receiver
There are some differences between the uplink and the downlink signal reception.
These are related mainly to the difference with the physical parameters of the signal,
like carrier frequency, modulation and coding.
In the USRP source block, the central frequency must be set to 5.7975 GHz. The
gain is set to 25, because the downlink signal has more power than the uplink one.
Therefore, the gain at reception can be reduced.
For the filtering, a band pass filter is used this time. This is due to some spurious
low frequency component found in the baseband signal upon reception. It is unknown
the source of this component, but it was necessary to remove it to obtain a baseband
signal close to the expected one. This effect can be seen in Figure 5.5. The low cutoff
frequency is set to 50 KHz, enough to remove the undesired frequency component.
The high cutoff frequency is set to 1 MHz, and the transition bandwidth is set to 25
KHz.
After this, the baseband signal can be visualized with a Time Sink block. However,
a complete demodulator was not achieved. There are two challenges here: the
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Figure 5.5: The downlink baseband signal (I/Q components), before bandpass
filtering.
Figure 5.6: The downlink baseband signal (only real component) after filtering.
modulation (amplitude modulation instead of PSK) and the FM0 coding, which
includes a signal transition in the middle of the symbol interval, and makes the
decoding harder than in the uplink. The baseband signal is quite similar in both
cases, with the difference that, due to the extra transition, two samples per symbol
must be taken for decision making. Therefore, the synchronization blocks which were
used for the BPSK signal should be valid for the downlink as well.
Finally, a decoder block similar to the one used in the uplink receiver has to be
built. This block could also be written in Python.
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Figure 5.7: The uplink signal after filtering, before synchronization.
5.5 Results and discussion
In this section, the main results obtained with the developed receivers will be presented
and discussed, as well as some other relevant outcomes about the developing process.
5.5.1 Reception and decoding
Throughout the receiver development process, many measures of the signal have
been taken, with help of GNU Radio’s time and frequency GUI sinks. Also, several
samples of the binary flow have been saved and examined, with help of a HEX editor.
In this project, Bless editor has been used.
Despite trying several different configurations for the receiver, the bit information
seems to have many bit errors, comparing to what the content of the VST message
should be according to the standards. The structure of both the BST and the VST
messages is given in Appendix. Looking at the signal in the time, it is easy to realize
that there are some time slots where the power of the wave is that low, that the
decision maker block (Binary Slicer) can make wrong bit decisions. This can be seen
in Figure 5.7.
It was expected that the synchronization blocks available in GNU Radio could
solve this problem, but they don’t work as expected with burst-based signals, as they
are designed mainly for continuous signal streams. Many other GNU Radio users
have reported these issues in the mailing lists, as can be seen in [gnu]. The signal
after synchronization is shown in Figure 5.8.
In Figure 5.9, a capture of the Bless editor is given. Here, the bit information
captured and saved to a file can be seen. The binary file corresponding to these
capture is included as an attachment to the document. As mentioned before, several
messages are captured, with some time intervals with no information in between
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Figure 5.8: The uplink signal after synchronization, with one bit per symbol.
Figure 5.9: A capture of the uplink binary flow.
(represented with a "0" bit). Each of the hexadecimal digits corresponds with 1 bit
of information.
In the VST seen in the capture, the "1" bits are marked in orange. It is possible
to appreciate the preamble, consisting in several "1" bits after the time slot where no
information is sent. However, although the frame length seems correct, it’s hard to
find coherence with this information and the contents indicated in the standards for
a VST. Furthermore, as it can be seen in the binary file, in several of the subsequent
captured messages even the preamble is difficult to distinguish. This is a good
indicator that the receiver has many errors. The reason for this is surely the fact that
it’s difficult to make correct bit decisions when the received signal level is not high
enough. The cause for this is unsure, but my guess is that a good synchronization
is necessary to recover the signal to a level where the decoding can be performed
correctly.
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The downlink baseband signal suffers the same problem, as can be appreciated
in Figure 5.6. Although the decoder for the downlink hasn’t been developed, it is
expected that the decoded bitflow won’t be correct until this problem is solved.
Other approaches for burst signal reception
Some other available projects related to burst signal reception with GNU Radio have
been studied. Some of these projects included new blocks for synchronization, which
could potentially help for the signal recovery.
One of the studied projects in this area was carried out by a telecommunications
student, Thomas Verelst, in 2017 [Ver17]. He designed new out-of-tree modules to
implement packet encoding and decoding. He built a correlation estimator block,
enhancing the implementation existing in GNU Radio, which is deprecated. He
uses tags (a signaling procedure implemented in later versions of GNU Radio) to
send synchronization information to both the timing and carrier recovery blocks
(Polyphase Clock Sync and Costas Loop). Another interesting project about PSK
burst demodulation was studied [bur]. Here, a very similar approach is followed, and
the shown results seem to be promising working with file source signals.
Both of the projects include newly developed out-of-tree modules and blocks,
which were downloaded, installed, and tested for the DSRC receiver. Although both
works are very interesting and add value in order to develop a burst decoder, the
blocks don’t seem to solve the previously mentioned problem in this project. It’s
important to remark that these projects didn’t have a real physical signal as an input
for the decoder, but a virtual one generated in GNU Radio and blocks which simulate
the channel. It is logical to think that more problems arouse when working with
signals from real systems, specially when it comes to synchronization and baseband
signal recovery.
Although none of these blocks were added to the design included as an attachment,
it would be an interesting task to perform a further study on these projects, including
the possibility of modifying some of the blocks to adapt them for a DSRC receiver.
Al the GNU Radio project available on the internet are free software, which makes
possible to access and modify blocks generated by many contributors. This is probably
the greatest advantage about working with this tool.
Chapter6Signal replaying and interference inEFC
Additionally to developing a DSRC receiver with the goal of eavesdropping the
communication involved in an EFC transaction, some other tests were performed
with the available SDR tools. The focus was put in analyzing the possibility of
capturing one of the signals involved in the communication, and later replay it to see
the effect in the system. Also, the effect of interference in the communication was
studied.
6.1 Recording and replaying signals
It is interesting to analyze the possibility of performing a replay attack in EFC. Since
the communication is not encrypted, and the authentication and message integrity
mechanisms are weak or sometimes even non existent, this could represent a big
threat.
For this, a rather simple setup in GNU Radio was prepared. This consisted in
using the same uplink and downlink receivers previously used, but removing all the
blocks after filtering and saving the results to a file. After this, another flowgraph
Figure 6.1: The flowgraph for signal recording.
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Figure 6.2: The flowgraph for re-transmission of the recorded signal.
Figure 6.3: The interference generator flowgraph.
was created using the same file as a source, and transmitting the signal directly.
Unfortunately, after trying to record both the uplink and downlink signals and
replay them, no effect is appreciated in the RSE (console message indicating a
VST reception). In the led-OBU, the led indicating a signal received in the carrier
frequency is intermittently on, but the led indicating a correct BST reception remains
off. It’s probable that, if the signal receiver had many problems to decode the signal,
the replay setup doesn’t work due to the same reception issues. It’s likely that the
recorded signal is not clean enough to be transmitted again, and be acknowledged by
any of the legitimate devices.
6.2 Interference issues and communication interruption
Another important issue to be aware of, is the potential interference between EFC
and other wireless technologies. The draft report [Com] published by the Electronic
Communications Committee (ECC) gives an insight into this issue. The Radio Local
Area Networks (RLAN) applications used in cars co-exist in the same frequency band
as EFC, which could cause problems in the tolling service availability.
To test the effect of interference in DSRC signals, a transmitter setup is prepared
with GNU Radio and an USRP. Here, a cosine function generator is used, which
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modulates a carrier at 5.7975 GHz to cause interference in the downlink, or at 5.799
GHz in the uplink. The GNU Radio flowgraph is shown in Figure 6.3.
After testing the transmitter, both in the downlink and uplink frequencies, the
communication between the RSE and the OBU was interrupted. When emitting
power in the uplink carrier frequency, the RSE didn’t receive any VST from the
OBU. The same happened when causing an interference in the downlink, in this case
because the OBU didn’t receive correctly the BSTs.
This tests show that the interference in the 5.8 GHz band can affect the EFC
communications in the toll roads. Therefore, it would be interesting to be aware of
this problem and make a further research on it, and in case of being necessary, work
on possible solutions.

Chapter7Conclusions
This Master’s Thesis has focused on contributing to the analysis of the EFC system
security, focusing on building a receiver for eavesdropping of the wireless commu-
nication between a RSE and an OBU, and analyzing the feasibility of this task
using rather cheap and available tools. While a bit-error free receiver has not been
successfully developed, the signal processing program can get much information
about the signal, down to bit-level, and could be used for further work on the same
area.
Developing a customized device to receive and transmit DSRC signals is not an
easy task. It requires much DSP knowledge, together with C++ programming skills
and a study on the standards. However, an attacker with the appropriate skill set,
but at the same time using publicly available tools, can get a lot of information about
the communication, and eventually develop a device which manages to eavesdrop
the data exchange in the toll roads. The vulnerabilities of the access control and
authentication mechanisms can also make key brute-forcing feasible, as shown by
previous works. This can lead to undesirable consequences for the toll road service
providers.
GNU Radio is a good and free tool for DSP, but its blocks have been mainly
written by volunteer contributors. In addition, most of the existing projects related
to burst signal detection were developed with test virtual signals, instead of a real
signal of a working system. Therefore, it can be hard to integrate existing blocks for
decoding a complex signal such as the one in DSRC. The most appropriate solution
seems to be developing own blocks for specific applications, but as stated before, this
is a task that requires C++ programming expertise and a broad background in DSP.
Additionally, the possibility of performing a signal replay attack have been
explored. Despite not being able to successfully replay downlink or uplink bursts,
this threat is real and should be taken into consideration. Some tests done with
the USRP and with GNU Radio show that a device emitting power at the same
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frequency spectrum as DSRC can interrupt the communication. This shows that,
apart from a potential delivered interference, some of the other wireless applications
using the same non-licensed band can disturb the communication.
7.1 Further work
There are several areas where future projects working with EFC security could focus
on. Firstly, it would be interesting to try to enhance the receiver, so that the signal
can be decoded without bit errors. Writing new synchronization blocks, or modifying
the ones already created by third parties, could be a solution for the problem. If
a DSRC transceiver is developed, it could open the door to perform many attacks
against the system.
Another potential task would be to test the feasibility of brute-forcing the AcK
and the AuK. Sandvold [San17] proposed in his Master’s Thesis a time-memory
trade off to obtain the AuK, performing a chosen-plaintext attack using a customized
RSE. This wouldn’t be possible with Security Level 1 in EFC, as the RSE must also
authenticate using a valid AuK. Therefore, it could be interesting to research about
attacking the access control, using a customized OBU to communicate with an RSE,
and obtaining plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
It’s also remarkable that the VST message is not integrity-protected, so its content
could be modified and still be accepted by the RSE, as long as its format is valid. This
can also be a good potential research. Finally, more time can be spent on analyzing
the effects of signal replaying in the system. For all this, the legacy equipment used
throughout this project can be useful.
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AppendixAStructure of a BST and a VST
In this appendix, the structure of a BST and a VST will be given, with all its
parameters and size. All the information is taken from EN 18234 [CEN03b] and EN
14906 [CEN11].
Note that both the BST and the VST are contained inside a LPDU in the
link-layer frame, as explained in Chapter 3.
Table A.1: Structure of a BST
Parameter Downlink
Rsu Beacon ID 6 octets
Time 4 octets
Profile 1 octet
Mandatory Application
List (sequence) 1 octet
Non-mandatory Appli-
cation List (sequence,
optional)
1 octet
Profile List (sequence) 1 octet
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Table A.2: Structure of a VST
Parameter Downlink
Fill 4 bits
Profile 1 octet
Application List (se-
quence)
–DSRC Application En-
tity ID 1 octet
–DSRC-EID 1 octet
–Application Context
Mark 16 octets
Obe Configuration
–Equipment Class 2 octets
–Manufacturer ID 2 octets
–OBE Status 2 octets
